It has been shown that in an otherwise standard one-sector real business cycle model with an indeterminate steady state under laissez faire, su¢ ciently progressive income taxation may stabilize the economy against aggregate ‡uctuations caused by agents'animal spirits. We show that this previous …nding can be overturned within an identical model which allows for sustained endogenous growth. Speci…cally, progressive taxation may operate like an automatic destabilizer that leads to equilibrium indeterminacy and sunspotdriven cyclical ‡uctuations in an endogenously growing macroeconomy. This instability result is obtained under two tractable progressive tax policy formulations that have been considered in the existing literature.
Introduction
As in traditional Keynesian macroeconomics, the conventional view on progressive taxation states that it automatically acts to alleviate the magnitude of ‡uctuations in households' disposable income and consumption expenditures. It follows that the cyclical volatilities of output and employment are ceteris paribus smaller when the economy is subject to a more progressive income tax schedule. As it turns out, such a standpoint continues to hold in the context of Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) one-sector real business cycle (RBC) model with aggregate increasing returns-to-scale in production, which in turn leads to an indeterminate steady state under laissez faire and no persistent growth. In particular, Guo and Lansing (1998) and Dromel and Pintus (2007) …nd that a su¢ ciently strong tax progressivity is able to stabilize the Benhabib-Farmer economy against business cycles driven by agents' animal spirits or sunspots. 1 In this paper, we show that these authors'…ndings are not robust within an identical model but allows for sustained endogenous growth, 2 i.e. progressive income taxation may operate like an automatic destabilizer that generates equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven ‡uctuations in several parametric con…gurations of our endogenously growing macroeconomy. This contradictory (instability) result is probably quite surprising in that the conditions which govern local dynamics of the no-growth and endogenous-growth formulations of the original Benhabib-Farmer model turn out to be the same.
Our analysis starts with incorporating Guo and Lansing's (1998) nonlinear …scal policy rule, which displays continuously increasing average and marginal tax rates, into the endogenous-growth version of Benhabib and Farmer's (1994, section 5) one-sector representative agent model in continuous time. To facilitate comparison with previous work, government spending is postulated to be useless that does not contribute to utility or production. 3 We focus on local stability properties of the economy's interior balanced growth path(s) along 1 In a similar vein, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) show that equilibrium indeterminacy can arise within standard one-sector RBC models under constant returns-to-scale in production and a balanced-budget rule where …xed government spending is …nanced by proportional taxation on labor or total income. This …s-cal formulation is qualitatively equivalent to regressive income taxation that may destabilize the no-growth macroeconomy. 2 It is straightforward to show that as in the no-growth counterpart, progressive income taxation may work like an automatic stabilizer in the exogenous-growth version of Banhabib and Farmer's (1994) model. 3 There has been an extensive literature that explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of various tax policies in an endogenous growth setting with useful public expenditures that contribute to …rms' productivity and/or households' utility. See, for example, Barro (1990) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Futagami, Mortia and Shibata (1993), Ravikumar (1994, 1997) , Cazzavillan (1996) , Turnovsky (1997 Turnovsky ( , 1999 , Zhang (2000) , Baier and Glomm (2001) , Yamarik (2001) , Palivos and Zhang (2002) , Park and Philippopoulos (2002) , Li and Sarte (2004) , Chen (2006) , Greiner (2006 Greiner ( , 2007 , Slobodyan (2006) , and Hu, Ohdoi and Shimomura (2008), among others. which hours worked are stationary, and output, consumption and physical capital all grow at a common constant rate. The resulting interrelations between …scal progressivity and macroeconomic (in)stability from three variants of our model are summarized as follows.
First, when the degree of productive externalities from labor hours is su¢ ciently low (including zero), the economy's unique balanced growth path (BGP) is shown to exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy and endogenous growth ‡uctuations under progressive income taxation; whereas Benhabib and Farmer (1994) …nd that the same parameterization yields local determinacy and saddle path stability without government intervention. In this case, the traditional viewpoint about progressive taxation is overturned. To understand the intuition for this indeterminacy result, start from a particular balanced-growth equilibrium, and suppose that agents become optimistic about the future of the economy. Acting upon this expectation, the representative household will reduce consumption and raise investment today, hence another dynamic trajectory ensues. When the tax progressivity is positive, we analytically show that the after-tax return on investment is monotonically increasing along the positively-sloped transitional path as the consumption-to-capital ratio rises. As a result, agents' initial rosy anticipations are validated and the alternative path becomes a self-ful…lling equilibrium.
Second, two possibilities for the speci…cation in which our model possesses dual BGP equilibria are analyzed. When the tax progressivity exceeds a critical level such that the after-tax equilibrium wage-hours locus is ‡atter than the labor supply curve, we show that both balanced growth paths are locally indeterminate, indicating that progressive income taxation may work as an automatic destabilizer. This result turns out to be exactly opposite to that obtained in Guo and Lansing (1998) whereby the same …scal-progressivity threshold is needed to stabilize the no-sustained-growth version of Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) economy against sunspot-driven aggregate ‡uctuations. When the after-tax equilibrium wagehours locus is upward-sloping and steeper than the labor supply curve, the requisite condition that governs the local stability properties for this formulation cannot be analytically derived.
Therefore, numerical experiments are conducted to quantitatively explore the model's equilibrium dynamics. Under the parameterization that is commonly adopted in the RBC-based indeterminacy literature, we …nd that the high-growth BGP is an indeterminate sink, and that the low-growth BGP exhibits saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness. In this case, progressive taxation does not a¤ect macroeconomic (in)stability as the two interior balancedgrowth equilibria in the original Benhabib-Farmer model without government intervention display identical equilibrium dynamics. For our third con…guration with zero tax progressiv-ity or ‡at income taxation, its local stability properties also remain qualitatively unchanged vis-à-vis those within Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) laissez-faire endogenous growth model, regardless of whether there exists one or two balanced growth paths in the macroeconomy.
Next, we examine the (in)stability e¤ects of Dromel and Pintus's (2007) linearly progressive tax scheme which imposes a constant marginal tax rate on the representative household's taxable income when it is higher than an exemption level. Although the condition that determines the number of BGP's in this setting is the same as that under Guo and Lansing's (1998) …scal policy rule, the resulting local dynamics are di¤erent. Speci…cally, as in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) no-government counterpart, our model's unique balanced growth path under linearly progressive taxation continues to display saddle path stability without the possibility of belief-driven cyclical ‡uctuations. On the other hand, the economy may possess two balanced-growth equilibria when the productive degree of labor externalities is su¢ ciently high. In this case, we …nd that both BGP's exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven growth ‡uctuations. This in turn implies that linearly progressive taxation can operate like an automatic destabilizer in our endogenously growing macroeconomy as well. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and analyzes its equilibrium conditions under a …scal policy rule that exhibits continuously increasing average and marginal tax rates. Section 3 investigates the local stability properties associated with the economy's balanced growth path(s). Section 4 analytically examines the interrelations between linearly progressive taxation and equilibrium (in)determinacy within our endogenously growing macroeconomy. Section 5 concludes.
The Economy
Our analysis begins with incorporating a progressive …scal policy rule a la Guo and Lansing (1998), which exhibits continuously increasing average and marginal tax rates, into the endogenous-growth version of Benhabib and Farmer's (1994, section 5) one-sector representative agent macroeconomy in continuous time. Households live forever, and derive utility from consumption and leisure. The production side consists of a social technology that displays increasing returns-to-scale due to positive productive externalities from aggregate capital and labor inputs. The government balances the budget each period by spending its tax revenue on goods and services that do not contribute to the households'utility or the …rms'production.
We assume that there are no fundamental uncertainties present in the economy.
Firms
There is a continuum of identical competitive …rms, with the total number normalized to one. The representative …rm i produces output y it according to a Cobb-Douglas production function
where k it and h it are capital and labor inputs, respectively, and x t represents positive productive externalities that are taken as given by each individual …rm. As in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) , we postulate that externalities take the form
where k t and h t denote the economy-wide levels of capital and labor services. In a symmetric equilibrium, all …rms make the same decisions such that k it = k t and h it = h t , for all i and t: As a result, (2) can be substituted into (1) to obtain the following aggregate increasing returns-to-scale production function for total output y t :
Notice that the economy exhibits sustained economic growth because the social technology (3) displays linearity in physical capital. Under the assumption that factor markets are perfectly competitive, the …rst-order conditions for the representative …rm's pro…t maximization problem are given by
where r t is the capital rental rate and w t is the real wage rate.
Households
The economy is also populated by a unit measure of identical in…nitely-lived households, each of which maximizes a discounted stream of utilities over its lifetime
where c t is consumption, 0 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, and > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. The budget constraint faced by the representative household is
where i t is gross investment, and t represents a proportional income tax rate. Investment adds to the stock of physical capital according to the following law of motion:
where 2 (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate.
In terms of the income tax rate, we adopt the sustained-growth version of Guo and Lansing's (1998, p.485, footnote 4) nonlinear tax formulation and postulate t as
where y t (= r t k t + w t h t ) is the household's taxable income, and y t denotes a benchmark level of income that is taken as given by the representative agent. In our model with ongoing growth, y t is set equal to the level of per capita output on the economy's balanced growth path (BGP) whereby
= for all t. 4 The parameters and govern the level and slope 4 In order for a balanced-growth equilibrium to exist in our model economy, the household's taxable income yt needs to grow at the same rate as the baseline level of output y t . The constant growth rate for y t will be endogenously determined through the model's equilibrium conditions (see equation 21) .
of the tax schedule, respectively. When > (<)0, the tax rate t is monotonically increasing (decreasing) with the household's income y t , i.e. agents with income above y t face a higher (lower) tax rate than those with income below y t . When = 0, all households face the constant tax rate 1 regardless of the level of their taxable income.
With regard to the progressivity features of the above tax structure, we note that the marginal tax rate mt , de…ned as the change in taxes paid by the household divided by the change in its taxable income, is given by
Our analyses in this paper are restricted to the environment in which the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes or transfers, hence t > 0 and mt > 0 are imposed. We also require t < 1 to ensure that the government can not con…scate all productive resources, and mt < 1 so that households have an incentive to provide labor and capital services to …rms. Along the economy's balanced-growth equilibrium path with y t = y t , these considerations imply that 2 (0; 1) and 1 < < 1, where 1 < 0. Next, in order to satisfy the secondorder conditions for the representative household's dynamic optimization problem, its budget constraint (7) needs to be jointly concave in the state and control variables, i.e. k t , c t and h t . It turns out that this requirement, together with 0 < < 1 and < 1, yields a more restrictive lower bound on the tax-slope parameter 0. Given these restrictions on and
, it is straightforward to show that when > 0, the marginal tax rate (10) is higher than the average tax rate given by (9) . In this case, the tax schedule is said to be "progressive". When = 0, the average and marginal tax rates coincide at the level of 1 , thus the tax schedule is " ‡at". Notice that the the original Benhabib-Farmer economy without income taxation corresponds to our model under = 1 and = 0.
As in Guo and Lansing (1998), we postulate that agents take into account the way in which the tax schedule a¤ects their net earnings when they decide how much to work, consume and invest over their lifetimes. Consequently, it is the marginal tax rate of income mt that governs the household's economic decisions. The …rst-order conditions for the representative household with respect to the indicated variables and the associated transversality condition (TVC) are c t :
TVC : lim
where t > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (7), (12) equates the slope of the household's indi¤erence curve to the after-tax real wage, (13) is the consumption Euler equation, and (14) is the transversality condition. Notice that under the restrictions on and speci…ed above, equations (11)- (13) are not only necessary, but also su¢ cient conditions for the unique global maximum of the household's optimization problem.
Government
The government sets the tax rate t according to (9) , and balances its budget each period.
Hence, its instantaneous budget constraint is given by
where g t is public spending on goods and services. With the government, the aggregate resource constraint for the economy is
Balanced Growth Path
We focus on the economy's balanced growth path(s) along which labor hours are stationary; whereas output, consumption, and physical capital all grow at a common constant rate . To facilitate the subsequent dynamic analyses, we adopt the variable transformation z t ct kt . Our model's equilibrium conditions (with _ y t y t = imposed) can then be collapsed into the following autonomous dynamical system:
An interior balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by a pair of positive real numbers
It is straightforward to derive from (17) and (18) that z is the solution(s) to the following nonlinear equation:
and that the corresponding expressions for employment h together with the common rate of economic growth are
and
For the existence and number of the economy's interior balanced growth path(s), we use the right-hand side of (19) to obtain
regardless of whether f 0 (z ) is positive or negative. Therefore, the equilibrium z can be located from the (possibly more than one) intersection(s) of f (z ) and the 45-degree line in the positive quadrant. Section 3 below will show that the number of BGP's in our model is governed by the sign of f 0 (z ) or (1 ) (1 + ) 1 , which turns out to be identical to that in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) macroeconomy under laissez faire.
Macroeconomic (In)stability
In terms of the local stability properties of a balanced-growth equilibrium path, we analytically compute the Jacobian matrix J of the dynamical system, de…ned by (17) and (18), evaluated at (h ; z ). The determinant and trace of the Jacobian are
The equilibrium dynamics of our model's balanced growth path(s) are determined by comparing the eigenvalues of J that have negative real parts to the number of initial conditions in the dynamical system (17)- (18), which is zero because h t and z t both are non-predetermined jump variables. 5 As a result, the BGP displays saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness when both eigenvalues have positive real parts. If one or two eigenvalues have negative real parts, then the balanced-growth equilibrium path is locally indeterminate (i.e. a sink) and can be exploited to generate endogenous growth ‡uctuations driven by agents' self-ful…lling expectations or sunspots.
In the remainder of this section, we examine the existence and number of the economy's interior balanced-growth equilibrium path(s), as well as their associated local dynamics, in three parametric con…gurations.
3.1 When 0 < < 1 and (1 ) (1 + ) 1 < 0
In this speci…cation, the …scal policy rule (9) is progressive with 2 (0; 1), and the degree of productive externalities from hours worked in …rms'production is relatively low (including zero). Moreover, the one-sector AK model of endogenous growth with …xed labor supply a la Chen and Guo (2016) corresponds to the limiting case of ! 1. Based on (22) and (23), Figure 1 depicts that f (z ) is a downward-sloping and convex curve which intersects the 45-degree line once in the positive quadrant; hence there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium characterized by z . Regarding local dynamics, it is straightforward to show that the determinant (24) of the model's Jacobian matrix J is negative, indicating that the BGP 5 Notice that k0 does not introduce an initial condition to the dynamical system (17)- (18) because the period-0 values of h0 and c0 are both endogenously determined.
exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven growth ‡uctuations. 6 On the contrary, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) …nd that the same parameterization yields local determinacy and saddle path stability without income taxation ( = 1 and = 0). These results together imply that in sharp contrast to a conventional automatic stabilizer, progressive taxation may destabilize an endogenously growing macroeconomy by generating cyclical ‡uctuations driven by agents'animal spirits.
The intuition for the above indeterminacy result can be understood through the model's phase diagram illustrated in Figure 2 . Using (17) and (18), we …nd that the equilibrium loci _ h t = 0 and _ z t = 0 are upward sloping, and that the _ z t = 0 locus is steeper than the positivelysloped stable arm (denoted as SS), followed by _ h t = 0. Next, start from a particular balanced growth path (h ; z ), and suppose that agents become optimistic about the economy's future.
Acting upon this anticipation, households will invest more and consume less today, which in turn lead to another dynamic trajectory
o that begins at (h 0 0 ; z 0 0 ) with h 0 0 < h and z 0 0 < z . Figure 2 shows that for this alternative path to become a self-ful…lling equilibrium, the after-tax return on investment (1 mt )M P K t must be monotonically increasing along the transitional path SS as the consumption-to-capital ratio z t ct kt rises. From (3)- (5) and (9)- (12), it can be shown that
As a consequence, agents'initial rosy expectation is validated under progressive income taxation.
3.2 When 0 < < 1 and (1 ) (1 + ) 1 > 0 Figure 3 shows that under progressive income taxation, f (z ) in this formulation is an upwardsloping convex curve with a positive vertical intercept (= ). Hence, the number of intersections between f (z ) and the 45-degree line in the positive quadrant can be zero, one, or two.
We proceed with …rst deriving the critical level of tax progressivity, denoted as^ , at which f (z ) is tangent to the 45-degree line such that there exists a unique BGP characterized byẑ and thus the equilibrium growth rate (ẑ). Using (22) with f 0 (ẑ) = 1 and (19) evaluated at 6 It can be shown that along any balanced-growth equilibrium path, z > since every term on the righthand-side of equation (19) is positive. Moreover, since 0 < < 1 and (1 ) (1 + ) 1 < 0, the second bracket term in the denominator of (24) (1 + )
Next, we …nd that an increase in the tax progressivity shifts the locus of f (z ) upwards because . To help understand the resulting local stability properties, we substitute (3) into the logarithmic version of the labor-market equilibrium condition (12) , and …nd that the slope of the after-tax equilibrium wage-hours locus is given by (1 ) (1 ) (1 + ) 1, while the slope of the household's labor supply curve is ( 0). It turns out that the relative steepness of these two curves in the labor market plays an important role in a¤ecting the local dynamics around both balanced-growth equilibria. 7 Notice that the left-hand-side of (28) is decreasing with respect to^ , whereas the right-hand-side is monotonically increasing. It follows that there will be a unique intersection that determines^ . 8 Since 0 < < 1, the bracket term in the numerator of (29) is greater than (1 ) (1 + ) (1 ) (1 + ), which can be rewritten as (1 ) (1 + ) 1 + (1 + ) > 0.
3.2.1 When 0 < <^ < 1 and (1 ) (1 ) (1 + ) 1 < In this case, the tax progressivity is lower than^ such that the model economy exhibits two interior balanced-growth equilibrium paths; and higher than the critical level c 1 1+ (1 )(1+ ) such that the after-tax equilibrium wage-hours locus is ‡atter than the labor supply curve. As a result, 0 < c < <^ < 1 within this speci…cation. Using (24), it is immediately clear that the two eigenvalues of the model's Jacobian matrix J are of opposite signs (Det < 0).
Therefore, both BGP's are locally indeterminate that may lead to macroeconomic instability, which in turn implies that progressive income taxation operates like an automatic destabilizer raising the magnitude of business cycle ‡uctuations. We also …nd that the intuition for this indeterminacy result is identical to that in section 3.1, demonstrated by the phase diagram in (25), (27) and z 1 <ẑ < z 2 as seen in Figure 3 , it is straightforward to show that T r (z 2 ) < T r (ẑ) < T r (z 1 ), where T r (ẑ) denotes the Jacobian's trace evaluated at z =ẑ given by
Without being able to obtain the analytical expressions of z 1 and z 2 from solving equation (19), we can not derive the exact condition that governs the local stability properties for this version of our model. As a result, numerical experiments are conducted to quantitatively explore the economy's equilibrium dynamics. Per the parameterization that is commonly adopted in the RBC-based indeterminacy literature, the capital share of national income, , is chosen to be (30),
, is now smaller than zero, T r (ẑ) and thus T r (z 2 ) both will be negative. This implies that in the neighborhood of the BGP associated with z 2 and (z 2 ), the model's Jacobian matrix J possesses a negative trace and a positive determinant. Therefore, the high-growth equilibrium path is a sink that exhibits indeterminacy and sunspots. On the other hand, we numerically verify that T r (z 1 ) > 0 under the benchmark parameterization, hence the low-growth BGP associated with z 1 and (z 1 ) displays saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness in that both eigenvalues have positive real parts. In this case, progressive income taxation does not a¤ect equilibrium (in)determinacy as the two interior balanced-growth equilibria in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) laissez-faire economy also exhibit exactly the same local stability properties. Figure 4 presents the phase diagram for the indeterminate high-growth BGP characterized by z 2 and (z 2 ). As in Figure 2 , the positively-sloped _ h t = 0 locus is ‡atter than _ z t = 0; however, the associated upward-sloping stable arms, denoted as SS 1 and SS 2 with each corresponding to a negative real eigenvalue, 10 are the ‡attest. When the representative household deviates from the original balanced-growth equilibrium (h ; z ) and lowers today's consumption because of its optimism about the economy's future, the resulting dynamic trajectory n h 0 t ; z 0 t o will begin at (h 0 0 ; z 0 0 ) with h 0 0 < h and z 0 0 < z . Figure 4 shows that when z t ct kt increases monotonically along a convergent transitional path, the equilibrium after-tax marginal product of capital (1 mt )M P K t must be rising in order to justify n z i.e. 
When = 0
In this case, the tax schedule (9) becomes ‡at with t = mt = 1 for all t. Resolving our model with = 0 yields the following single di¤erential equation in z t ct kt that describes its equilibrium dynamics:
Following the same procedure as in section 2.4, an interior balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by a positive real number z that satis…es _ z t = 0, which leads to
where
We then linearize (31) around z and …nd that the model's equilibrium dynamics are determined by the eigenvalue it is straightforward to show the existence of two interior BGP equilibria (similar to Figure   3 ) with z 1 < z 2 , 0 < g 0 (z 1 ) < 1 and g 0 (z 2 ) > 1. As a result, the high-growth equilibrium is a sink in that h 1 g 0 (z 2 ) i z 2 < 0, whereas the low-growth equilibrium is a saddle due to h 1 g 0 (z 1 ) i z 1 > 0. These …ndings illustrate that our endogenously growing macroeconomy under ‡at income taxation exhibits the same local stability properties as those in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) otherwise identical model under laissez faire.
Linearly Progressive Taxation
Dromel and Pintus (2007) point out that the feature of continuously increasing average and marginal tax rates a la equations (9)- (10) is not consistent with the progressive tax policies observed in many developed countries, hence they incorporate an alternative …scal formulation into Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) indeterminate one-sector real business cycle model under laissez faire and no endogenous growth. Speci…cally, a constant marginal tax rate is imposed on the household's taxable income when it exceeds a …xed exemption threshold, namely linearly progressive taxation is levied. As in Guo and Lansing (1998) , these authors …nd that the economy will be immune to sunspot-driven cyclical ‡uctuations when the exemption threshold is larger than a critical level, or when the associated tax progressivity is su¢ ciently high.
In this section, we adopt the time-varying version of Dromel and Pintus' (2007) linearly progressive tax formulation and then examine its (de)stabilization e¤ects within the endogenously growing macroeconomy described in section 2. The budget constraint faced by the representative household is now changed to
where y t (= r t k t + w t h t ) is the household's taxable income, and E t represents the exemption threshold that is postulated to grow continuously at the same rate as per-capita output on the economy's balanced growth path, i.e.
_ Et Et = _ y t y t = for all t. As in Dromel and Pintus (2007) , we …rst analyze the environment with y t > E t > 0 for all t, and a constant marginal tax rate 2 (0; 1) that is higher than the corresponding average tax rate given by 1 Et yt . It follows that the tax schedule under consideration here is progressive.
Next, it is straightforward to show that (i) the equilibrium conditions for this speci…cation can be represented by the following autonomous dynamical system in terms of x t Et yt and z t ct kt with no given initial condition:
(ii) the existence and number of the economy's interior balanced growth path(s) are governed
(1 )(1+ ) (1 )(1+ ) 1
and (iii) the determinant and trace of the resulting Jacobian matrix are
Interestingly, the requisite condition that governs the number of balanced growth path(s) in this setting turns out to be identical to that in section 3 under Guo and Lansing's (1998) nonlinear …scal policy rule. When (1 ) (1 + ) 1 < 0, there exists a unique balancedgrowth equilibrium path in that m (z ) is a negatively-sloped and convex curve (similar to Figure 1 ). Given z > > 0 (see equation 38), the BGP expressions of all other endogenous variables can be easily derived. 11 We also …nd that the Jacobian's determinant (41) and trace (42) for this con…guration are positive, hence both eigenvalues have positive real parts.
It follows that as in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) laissez-faire counterpart, the economy's unique balanced-growth equilibrium under linearly progressive taxation continues to display saddle path stability without the possibility of endogenous cyclical ‡uctuations.
On the other hand, Figure 5 depicts that the number of balanced growth paths can be zero, one, or two when (1 ) (1 + ) 1 > 0. As in section 3.2, we use (39) with m 0 (ẑ) = 1 and (38) evaluated atẑ to obtain 1 1 It can be shown that along the economy's balanced growth path, h = h
whereÊ is the unique solution to the following equation: 12 Figure 5 also shows that an increase in E 0 shifts the locus of m(z ) upwards because of a higher vertical intercept, thus two balanced-growth equilibria characterized by z 1 <ẑ < z 2 will emerge when E 0 <Ê. In this case, the model's Jacobian matrix possesses a negative determinant a la (41), indicating that the two eigenvalues are of opposite signs. Therefore, both BGP's exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven growth ‡uctuations, which in turn implies that linearly progressive taxation may also operate like an automatic destabilizer in our endogenously growing macroeconomy. Intuitively, when households become optimistic and decide to raise their investment expenditures today, it can be shown that the aforementioned mechanism that makes for multiple equilibria, i.e. an increase in the equilibrium after-tax marginal product of capital, will generate convergent trajectories toward the original balanced growth path. As a result, agents' initial rosy anticipation about the economy's future is validated.
Finally, when the tax schedule is ‡at with E t = 0 for all t, we …nd that the model's equilibrium conditions are described by the following single di¤erential equation in z t ct kt :
Since the right-hand-side of (45) only di¤ers from that of (31) with the constant term in front of z In sum, the preceding analyses have shown that the conventional view about progressive income taxation, as well as the …ndings of Guo and Lansing (1998) and Dromel and Pintus (2007) , can be reversed in a one-sector representative agent model that exhibits sustained endogenous growth. Table 1 summarizes our results on the interrelations between income taxation and equilibrium (in)determinacy, together with those obtained in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) without government intervention and persistent growth as a reference point, in each parametric speci…cation that has been examined.
Conclusion
This paper systematically examines the interrelations between progressive taxation of income and macroeconomic (in)stability in a one-sector model of endogenous growth with variable labor supply and useless public spending. In stark contrast to traditional Keynesian-type stabilization policies, we …nd that progressive taxation may operate like an automatic destabilizer which yields equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven ‡uctuations within several parametric speci…cations of our endogenously growing macroeconomy. Under Guo and Lans- This paper can be extended in several directions. For example, it would be worthwhile to explore alternative mechanisms for generating endogenous growth (e.g. human capital accumulation), and/or an economy with national debt or multiple production sectors. In addition,
we can incorporate features that are commonly adopted in the new-Keynesian literature, such as price stickiness, wage rigidity and investment adjustment costs, among others. These possible extensions will allow us to examine the robustness of this paper's theoretical results and policy implications, as well as further enhance our understanding of the relationship between progressive taxation and macroeconomic (in)stability in an endogenously growing economy.
We plan to pursue these research projects in the near future. 
